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Abstract
In responses to Norheim’s editorial, this commentary offers reflections from Thailand, how the five unacceptable 
trade-offs were applied to the universal health coverage (UHC) reforms between 1975 and 2002 when the whole 64 
million people were covered by one of the three public health insurance systems. This commentary aims to generate 
global discussions on how best UHC can be gradually achieved. Not only the proposed five discrete trade-offs 
within each dimension, there are also trade-offs between the three dimensions of UHC such as population coverage, 
service coverage and cost coverage. Findings from Thai UHC show that equity is applied for the population coverage 
extension, when the low income households and the informal sector were the priority population groups for coverage 
extension by different prepayment schemes in 1975 and 1984, respectively. With an exception of public sector 
employees who were historically covered as part of fringe benefits were covered well before the poor. The private 
sector employees were covered last in 1990. Historically, Thailand applied a comprehensive benefit package where 
a few items are excluded using the negative list; until there was improved capacities on technology assessment that 
cost-effectiveness are used for the inclusion of new interventions into the benefit package. Not only cost-effectiveness, 
but long term budget impact, equity and ethical considerations are taken into account. Cost coverage is mostly 
determined by the fiscal capacities. Close ended budget with mix of provider payment methods are used as a tool for 
trade-off service coverage and financial risk protection. Introducing copayment in the context of fee-for-service can 
be harmful to beneficiaries due to supplier induced demands, inefficiency and unpredictable out of pocket payment 
by households. UHC achieves favorable outcomes as it was implemented when there was a full geographical coverage 
of primary healthcare coverage in all districts and sub-districts after three decade of health infrastructure investment 
and health workforce development since 1980s. The legacy of targeting population group by different prepayment 
mechanisms, leading to fragmentation, discrepancies and inequity across schemes, can be rectified by harmonization 
at the early phase when these schemes were introduced. Robust public accountability and participation mechanisms 
are recommended when deciding the UHC strategy.
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Background 
In Norheim’s editorial,1 based on fairness, equity and ethical 
grounds, his five “unacceptable trade-offs” in implementing 
universal health coverage (UHC) seems convincing. Our 
analysis found that three out of these five are related to equity 
goal; trade-off II (prioritize those who are able to pay than the 
poor and informal sector), trade-off IV (prioritize the well-off 
than the worse-off) and trade-off V (move from out of pocket 
payment by households to a less progressive mandatory 
prepayment source of finance).
The remaining two are related to efficiency goal: trade-off I 
(extend coverage to the low or medium priority services than 
the high priority services) and trade-off III (provide costly 
services with low health benefits than less costly high impact 
services). Note that the unacceptable trade-off II and IV are 
very close. In this editorial, efficiency is regarded as part of 
fairness. 
Since health resources are finite, using it for one purpose, 
policy-makers have to sacrifice other alternates; hence trade-
off and priority setting is unavoidable. These unacceptable 
trade-offs are theoretically sound and convincing; they are 
useful caveats for which policy-makers in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) may use to make informed, fair 
and ethical choices in their paths towards UHC. 
This commentary offers reflections from a country 
experiences, Thailand, how these trade-offs were (or were not) 
applied in implementing UHC reforms since 1975 until UHC 
was reached in 2002,2 and achieved favourable outcomes.3 
This commentary aims to generate global discussions on how 
best UHC can be gradually achieved. 
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of Conflicts
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the op ortunity for political changes, through political articulation of a  issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies th ee relat d problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks c vering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health res arch “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of org nized interest groups,” as  “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
se ondary, or derived from the political?
That is what w  will try to do here, by introducing an 
lternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence n the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e ate a t t e 
r le f er i  gl al ealt , rik s e asizes 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tif es t ee relat  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e  
a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f gree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
e c e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al ealt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi ce- ase  
a r ac  is  fic i ,” a t at s c  a vie  risks c veri g  
“t e r le f litics a  er.” t y c trasti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e states t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc ss t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at  ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
lter at ve c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str tivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  er res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ce ti  f 
t e litical, ere “t e litical el gs t  r t l gical 
c iti .”3 cc r i g t  ffe, s ciety is i stit te  
t r g  c flict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices a  i stit ti s 
t r g  ic  a  r er is cr ate , rga izi g a
c existe ce i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi e  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a t ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
t e fixati  f s cial relati s is artial a  recari s, si ce 
a tag is  is a  ever rese t ssi ility.  liticize a  iss e 
a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i  a c flict al a er “ it  se  ca s it  
ic  e le ca  i e tify.”3 
s ses t e case f “i creasi g i ter ati al ai  s e i g 
 I S treat e t” t  ill strate is i t.1 e fra es t e 
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UHC Cube: Trade-off Within and Across Three Dimensions 
Trade-off is a situation where one must decide to choose 
between or balance the two alternatives that are opposite or 
cannot be taken at the same time. There are three dimensions 
of the UHC cube (see Figure 1). The X axis is the population 
coverage, the Y axis is the cost coverage measured by level 
of out of pocket cost sharing by members, and the Z axis is 
the service coverage, how comprehensive the benefit package 
would cover? There are also trade-offs between these three 
dimensions such as should the country cover more services 
to certain groups, or same service for the whole population?
X Axis: Population Coverage 
Within each of the three dimensions, there are trade-offs. 
On the X axis, we concur with Norheim’s assertion, on an 
ethical ground, that the poor, the worse off and certain 
disadvantaged groups who are unable to pay their medical 
bills should be covered first. This ethical choice will gain high 
political support, if these population sub-groups are vocal 
constituencies who cast their votes or influence others in 
an election every four to five years in developing countries. 
Unfortunately, very often they are voiceless and powerless. 
Increasingly, private sector employment are growing 
especially in middle-income context, that payroll tax financed 
social health insurance (SHI) systems should be introduced 
as soon as possible, in order to minimize the regressive out 
of pocket payment, with a caveat that payroll tax finance 
must be designed as a progressive source, where the higher 
income employees pay higher contribution than the lower 
income counterparts. When window of opportunities open, 
SHI can be introduced immediately, and no need to wait for 
full coverage of the poor.
In developing countries, implementing tax financed scheme 
dedicated for the poor, or exempting them from paying user 
fees is challenging. Thailand medical welfare scheme for 
the low income households introduced in 1975; premium 
funded voluntary health card scheme for the informal sector 
in 1984; and payroll tax financed SHI scheme for private 
sector employees in 1990 demonstrated the explicit political 
decision on population extension on the X axis based on 
ethical principles, the more vulnerable they are, the higher 
priority they receive. 
Z Axis: Service Coverage 
On the Z axis, which service package is offered to different 
population group is a political choice, often governed by 
the government fiscal spaces and how priority is made; 
either informed by cost-effectiveness evidence, financial 
risk protection, equity or pragmatism. Often there is limited 
technology assessment capacity in developing countries. 
Though global evidence is available such as Disease Control 
Priority4 and Cost-effectiveness and strategic planning 
(WHO-CHOICE),5 countries need capacities to translate 
them into policies and implementation. As comprehensive 
benefit package was fully applied in all financial risk protection 
schemes, it is not possible to apply a new positive list covering 
basic essential package; hence pragmatism is applied by Thai 
reform, with the application of negative list, where all services 
are covered except a few in the list. 
Despite the cost-ineffectiveness and large budget impact, 
renal replacement therapy for kidney failure patients, a life 
threatening condition, was approved by the government in 
2008 on equity ground and financial protection. Two other 
schemes, the government employee and the private sector 
employee schemes have full coverage of renal replacement 
treatment; should not the universal coverage scheme (UCS) 
get this similar service? Cost of treatment is catastrophic to 
UCS members, certain patients died from inadequate out of 
pocket financed dialysis, leaving behind a large debt to repay 
by family.6-8 
Inequity arises when certain services are not available in 
remote rural areas where the poor live, but enjoyed by urban 
rich population. Introducing UHC without adequate and 
equitable distribution of supply side capacity is prone to pro-
rich outcomes, as demonstrated in China9 and Philippines.10 
While extensive geographical coverage of functioning primary 
healthcare determines the pro-poor UHC outcomes.11,12 
The Thai UHC was introduced after three decades of 
government investment in health service infrastructure in 
particular district health systems, and ensuring functioning 
of health service through mandatory rural services by health 
professional graduates.13 Skilled birth attendance had reached 
99.3% of total births; and contraceptive prevalence 79.2% of 
women age 15-49 in 2000, well before UHC achievement in 
2002.14 An extensive geographical coverage of functioning 
health services is the foundation for effective UHC 
implementation. 
Y Axis: Cost Coverage 
On Y axis, cost sharing is interlinked with X axis, which 
population group should or should not co-pay, and interlink 
with Z axis, which services should be fully subsidized. 
Clearly, Thailand applied equity principle where the poor 
are exempted from payment or copayment; and efficiency 
principle where services such as maternal and child health, 
immunization, cost effective interventions and community-
based public health interventions are fully subsidized to the 
whole population, not only the poor due to external benefits. 
Until recently when UHC was achieved in 2002 that all 
services in the benefit package are fully covered, free at point 
of services; this is not because improved fiscal capacity but the 
application of close end payment which has the merits of cost 
Figure 1. The Three Dimensions of WHO UHC Cube.
Abbreviations: WHO, World Health Organization; UHC, universal 
health coverage.
Y Axis
Z Axis
X Axis
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containment and system efficiency. Efficiency frees up more 
resources for zero co-pays. 
A caveat on copayment, introducing copayment as percentage 
of the medical bills in particular when insurance agency 
applies fee-for-service is harmful to the patients in particular 
the low income; ample evidence shows that fee-for-service 
stimulates supplier induced demand (demand in excess 
of what patient would choose) because of information 
asymmetry in healthcare market, hence professional acts as 
patients’ agent and making decision on their behalf. Fee-for-
service provides opportunities for professionals to maximize 
services.15 Copayment can be applied to discourage bypassing 
primary healthcare. However, ensuring quality at primary 
healthcare to gain citizens’ trust and confidence are important 
prerequisites. 
Strategic purchasing comes into play to contain cost and 
protect members from catastrophic spending and medical 
impoverishment. Institutional capacities to manage 
purchasing by insurance agencies are contributing factors to 
efficiency and equity.3 Cost coverage in Y and service coverage 
in Z axes are interlinked under the strategic purchasing design 
and implementation.13 
UHC achieves favorable outcomes as it was implemented 
when there was a full geographical coverage of primary 
healthcare coverage in all districts and sub-districts after 
three decade of health infrastructure investment and health 
workforce development since 1980s.
Thailand UHC Trajectory: A Long March Between 1975 
and 2002
Figure 2 portrays three distinct groups of Thai population, for 
which different prepayment schemes are introduced. 
At the bottom layer, people living below national poverty line 
was covered by publicly financed medical welfare schemes, 
launched in 1975, which gradually extended to cover all 
elderly, children under 12 years old, persons with disability 
and village health volunteers. 
At the top layer, government employees and their dependents 
are historically covered by non-contributed tax financed 
scheme, as part of the comprehensive welfare. Civil servants’ 
salary is claimed to be lower than labour market. The private 
sector employees are covered by payroll tax financed SHI, 
launched in 1990, as part of the comprehensive social security 
including pensions and unemployment benefits. 
The informal sector, at the middle layer, was covered by 
Figure 2. Thailand Trajectories Towards UHC. 
Abbreviation: UHC, universal health coverage.
voluntary premium financed public insurance launched 
in 1984 by the Ministry of Public Health, and later 50% of 
premium was subsidized by the government in 1992. Despite 
Ministry of Public Health’s efforts, coverage remained low; 
by 2001, 30% of total population was uninsured. Clearly, 
voluntary nature of prepayment scheme cannot achieve UHC. 
In 2002, in keeping UHC political manifesto in the 2001 
general election, decisive political decision was made to 
cover the whole bottom and middle layers by UCS, financed 
by general tax. Tax is one of the most progressive sources of 
financing.3 Squeezing from the bottom described in Figure 
2, by tax financed reflects strong government commitment 
on UHC. It is technically not feasible to enforce premium 
payment by the large size informal sector and their irregular 
income; while premium financed UCS is political non-
palatable. Effectiveness of premium collection and equity 
in financial contribution were the two main concerns in 
extending coverage to the informal sector. Additional budget 
required to finance UCS is within fiscal capacities in 2002. 
The use of closed end budget with mixed provider payment 
methods in UCS contains cost and prevents supplier induced 
demands. 
Arguments arise on inequity in financial contribution that 
private sector employees have double contributions: payroll-
tax for SHI coverage and general tax (direct and indirect) 
while UCS members only contribute to general tax. This may 
incentivize an increased informality in the economy. Tax 
financed UHC is the political choice and societal preference 
to maintain payroll tax financed SHI. It is a political correct 
and technical sound decisions to apply tax-finance UHC in 
2002 when Thailand decided to achieve UHC fairly quickly.16 
Advocates to abolish contribution in SHI is not a political 
correct and economic sound proposal given the increased size 
of formal sector. 
Finally, the reform in 2002 resulted in UCS for the bottom 
and middle layers, 75% of total people; while keeping intact 
the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme for government 
employees and SHI for private employees. The application 
of close ended budget facilitates more comprehensive service 
coverage and high financial risk protection for UCS and SHI 
members. 
The key designs contributing to favorable outcomes are; a 
comprehensive benefit package and free at point of service 
contributes to high level of financial risk protection as 
measured by the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure 
and medical impoverishment3; contracting with district 
health systems contributes to pro-poor use of services and 
public resources as measured by benefit incidence.11 
After UHC: Fragmentation Across Different Schemes 
Fragmented schemes are essential feature of UHC transition 
when most countries apply targeting population groups. 
Norheim assumes a single entity in making decisions about 
how to expand coverage; there are many actors having stakes 
on UHC, such as Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour and 
also private insurance agencies. Expansions of services that 
are privately financed are hard to influence in a laissez fair 
economy.
In the stride towards UHC, various countries extend 
coverage to different population sub-group when windows 
Bottom layer: the poor families, 
measured by poverty or other arbitrary 
measures
Middle layer: Informal sector
Borderline poor and non-poor
Top layer: formal public private sector 
employees and dependants 15%
70%
15%
Contributory scheme
OR Subsidized contributory scheme
OR Tax-financed scheme
CSMBS, 
SHI
UCS
Payroll tax financed
Social Health Insurance: tripartite 
contributory scheme 
Squeeze from the TOP
Squeeze from the BOTTOM
Tax-financed social welfare scheme:
The poor, elderly, children <12 years, 
disable, village health volunteers
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of opportunity opened, for example the poor subsidized by 
general tax, the private sector employees by SHI payroll tax 
financed scheme, and informal sector by premium financed 
voluntary community based health insurance, with or without 
government subsidies, such as the case of Thailand,2 China,17 
Lao PDR.18 These trajectories result in discrepancies across 
different insurance schemes in term benefit package and 
provider payment — causing inequity and inefficiency. 
In the paths towards UHC, LMICs should recognize these 
challenges facing the pathfinder countries; efforts should be 
given to minimize the gap of inequity through harmonization 
strategic purchasing (in particular benefit package, level 
of public subsidies and provider payment methods) across 
different schemes, if unavoidably different schemes for 
different population groups are applied. 
Conclusion 
We fully support Norheim’s recommendation that “Robust 
public accountability and participation mechanisms are, 
therefore, essential when deciding on the overall strategy and 
the appropriateness of central trade-offs on the path to UHC.” 
However, not all LMICs have such platform. Cross country 
learning and sharing lessons from UHC pathfinder countries 
convened by international development partners, as well as 
institutional capacity strengthening focusing on strategic 
purchasing function are further recommended. 
Expansions of financial risk protection are incremental 
processes where there is no “clean slate” furnished with all 
ethical options for making UHC choices; reformists should 
stand ready when the political windows open to re-orient 
toward more equitable and ethical choices.
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